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be contrary to the national labor policy, as it would either eliminate or
emasculate the grievance and arbitration structure, because the union would
then be prompted also to insist on the elimination of mandatory arbitration
provisions, which give rise to the implied no-strike clause. This approach
would threaten the stability of production, employee earning power, and
product availability. Fortunately, however, the possibility of management's
permitting the inclusion of broad strike powers in agreements is remote.
The second and more probable result of Eazor is that labor will actively
use the "reasonable means" catalogued by the court. The court in Eazor
imposed liability on the union not because a wildcat strike occurred, but
because the union did not use every reasonable means to bring about the
strike's end. In connection with this result, it is likely that, if the courts
allow the parties to contractually modify their respective duties, unions
then will seek to clarify their duty by contractually expressing and limiting
the means required to discharge that duty. Thus, Eazor may not have the
broad impact it might be thought to have at a first reading. However, it does
give management a position of strength at the bargaining table.
Perhaps the most important positive effect of Eazor will be the promotion of cooperation between management and labor. If an unauthorized
strike were to occur, both labor and management would be prompted to
take coordinated, affirmative action toward a common goal, the resumption
of work. This cooperation will be an important step in further promoting
peaceful resolution of labor disputes.
Anthony A. DeSabato

SECURITIES REGULATION -

AN UNSUCCESSFUL TENDER OFFEROR

HAS STANDING TO SUE THE TARGET CORPORATION, THE SUCCESSFUL
CONTESTANT,

AND

THE

UNDERWRITER,

FROM VIOLATIONS OF SECTION

14(e)

FOR

DAMAGES

AND RULE

RESULTING

lOb-6.

Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. (2d Cir. 1973)
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. (CCI) brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York against Piper Aircraft Corporation (Piper), Bangor Punta Corporation (BPC) and First
Boston Corporation (First Boston), alleging various violations of the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), including sections 14(e) and 10(b) and Securities Exchange Commission rules lOb-5 and lOb-6. 1
1. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 355 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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CCI had sought to acquire control of, and a majority shareholder
interest in, Piper by first purchasing approximately 13 per cent of the outstanding Piper stock 2 and then attempted to consolidate its position through
three successive tender offers. 3 The attempt was successfully opposed by
the management of Piper - the Piper family - through a three-stage
defense: first, the distribution of letters to the Piper shareholders which
stated that CCI's initial cash tender offer was "inadequate and not in
[their] best interests";4 second, the public announcement that Grumman
Aircraft Engineering Corporation (Grumman) had agreed to purchase
300,000 shares of authorized, but unissued, Piper stock at the same price
as that of the CCI offer (the announcement failed to disclose that a "put
arrangement" was part of the agreement) ;5 and, third, subsequent to the
expiration of CCI's initial offer, 6 the negotiation, through its investment
advisor, First Boston, of an agreement with BPC whereby BPC, rather
than CCI, would obtain control of Piper. 7 After a formal agreement
was reached with BPC, Piper publicly announced that BPC would obtain
2. 480 F.2d at 350. CCI also acquired a number of shares while its first tender
offer was outstanding. Id. at 352 n.5.
3. A tender offer has been described as follows:
A tender offer has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made invitation
addressed to all shareholders of a corporation [target corporation] to tender their
shares for sale at a specified price. Cash or other securities may be offered to the
shareholders as consideration; in either case, the consideration specified usually
represents a premium over the current market price of the securities sought.
This opportunity to tender shares at a premium remains open only for a limited
period of time ....
[O] fferors typically condition their obligation to purchase on
the aggregate tender of a stated number of shares.
Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251-52 (1973) (footnotes omitted). See Fleischer &
Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967).
In the instant case, CCI first made a cash tender offer for up to 300,000 shares
at $65 per share. 480 F.2d at 351. CCI's two subsequent offers were for the exchange
of securities instead of cash, i.e., exchange offers. Id. at 354.
4. 480 F.2d at 351 quoting letter from W.T. Piper, Jr., to all shareholders,
Jan. 27, 1969. See note 84 infra.
5. 480 F.2d at 351. The agreement was signed "with 'the intention of Grumman
and Piper to explore the desirability of a merger of their two corporations.'" Id.,
quoting Agreement between Piper and Grumman, Jan. 28, 1964. However, the "put
arrangement" gave Grumman the option of returning the Piper shares in six months
at a specified price with interest. Id. See note 93 infra. The plan was mutually
abandoned when the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) advised that it would not
list the new Piper shares. 480 F.2d at 352. Piper was later involved in two similarly
abortive agreements with Southply, Inc. and United States Concrete Pipe Co. of
Florida (Concrete Pipe). In both instances, Piper agreed to exchange a number of
its authorized, but unissued shares for shares of Concrete Pipe and Southply, apparently hoping to increase the number of outstanding Piper shares in order to make
CCI's acquisition of a majority of Piper stock more difficult. These agreements were
also rescinded when the NYSE refused to list the new Piper shares and initiated
delisting procedures. Id.
6. CCI's initial tender offer had resulted in an acquisition of 304,606 shares
which brought CCI's total to 33 per cent of the outstanding stock. 480 F.2d at 352.
7. For a brief discussion of the reason for Piper's preference for BPC over CCI,
see note 84 infra.
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the entire Piper family holdings of Piper stock 8 and would' make an
exchange offer to the remainder of the Piper shareholders. 9
BPC filed the appropriate statements and preliminary prospectus in
accordance with SEC regulations. 10 However, the preliminary prospectus,
the final prospectus, and an opinion letter by First Boston" concerning the
valuation of BPC's exchange offer, failed to mention the negotiations by
BPC for the sale of one of its major assets at a price substantially below
that carried on the corporate records, 12 with the effect that BPC's offer
was made more attractive to Piper shareholders since its assets appeared
more valuable. Due to the general attractiveness of the BPC offer, Piper
family approval, and purchases of Piper stock while the exchange offer
8. The Piper family holdings amounted to 501,090 shares for which BPC offered
a package of securities valued at $70-$72 per Piper share. The announcement did not
mention that if, at the time of the general exchange offer, this figure was not at $80
per Piper share, BPC would make up the difference to the Piper family with additional
BPC stock or cash. 480 F.2d at 353.
9. According to the press release, BPC's exchange offer was valued by First
Boston "at not less than $80 per share." Id., quoting Press Release issued by Piper
and BPC, May 8, 1969.
10. In accordance with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d) (1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(1) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act], and rule 14d-l(a), 17
C.F.R. 240.14d-1 (2) (1973) which applied the disclosure requirements of the Exchange
Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970), to tender offers, BPC filed a Schedule
13D, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-101 (1973) with the SEC describing the agreement with
Piper. 480 F.2d at 353. The purpose of Schedule 13D is to disclose, as a matter of
public record, the pertinent facts surrounding a particular tender offer - primarily
the name of the offeror, the source of his funds, and any plans it may have for the
target corporation upon attaining control. See Bromberg, The Securities Laws of
Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 459, 482-87 (1969).
Subsequently, BPC filed an S-1 registration statement, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
71212 (July 18, 1973), with the SEC as required by the Securities Act of
1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970) [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act], before an
offer to sell the securities could be made by the offeror. 480 F.2d at 353. Section 5 (b)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970), requires that, after the registration
statement has been filed and unless an exception is available, a prospectus, meeting
the standards of the 1933 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77(j) (1970), must accompany or
precede any security being transmitted through the mails or interstate commerce for
the purpose of a sale or delivery after sale of that security. The term prospectus is
defined in the 1933 Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1970). BPC's preliminary prospectus
was permitted to be filed with the registration statement by the use of form S-1, as
long as the preliminary prospectus satisfied the 1933 Act § 5(b) (1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e(b)(1) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 230. 433 (1973).
Because the press release was issued before the registration statement was
filed, the SEC brought suit against Piper and BPC in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, contending the press release amounted to a
prospectus and, therefore, was violative of the 1933 Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c)
(1970), and rule 135, 17 C.F.R. 230.135 (1973). Both defendants agreed to an injunction without admitting the allegations. 480 F.2d at 353. The Second Circuit
later held in an en banc decision related to the instant case that Piper and BPC had
violated these regulations. 426 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1970). See note 15 infra.
11. First Boston was the underwriter of the Piper-BPC transaction and, therefore, if the registration statement contained a misstatement or misleading omission
of a material fact, had potential liability to shareholders who accepted BPC's offer.
1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). See note 75 infra. The definition of an
underwriter is set forth in the 1933 Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
12. BPC carried the Bangor and Aroostook Railroad (BAR) at a book value
of $18.5 million, but was negotiating a sale of BAR for $5 million. 480 F.2d at 354.
The effect was to give BPC stock an inflated book value.
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was awaiting SEC approval, 13 BPC was able to accumulate 51 per cent of
the outstanding shares of Piper stock, thereby defeating CCI's takeover
14
bid.
The district court dismissed CCI's claim for damages, 15 holding that
CCI had no standing to sue under rule lOb-5 or section 14(e) because
there was no evidence that CCI had been directly affected by the violations.'
Furthermore, the court concluded that even though BPC had violated rule
1Ob-6,' 7 the violation had not caused injury to CCI.' 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that CCI had a private right for damages against
all three defendants for material violations of section 14(e),19 on the grounds

that CCI had been directly injured as a result of the violations. 20 In addition, the court of appeals determined that BPC's purchases of Piper shares
while the exchange offer was being reviewed by the SEC were incompatible with rule lOb-6 and in themselves injured CCI. Chris-Craft In13. Under the 1933 Act § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1970), there is a 20-day
waiting period before the registration statement becomes effective, which may be
extended by amendment to the registration statement, during which the SEC
examines the statement. BPC made cash purchases totalling 120,200 shares during
this waiting period, 480 F.2d at 353.
14. 480 F.2d at 354. CCI's second offer, an exchange offer, which had been
made at the time of BPC's offer, was withdrawn. A third offer resulted in the
acquisition of 112,089 shares. Together with the shares purchased and the shares
obtained through the initial offer, CCI acquired 41 per cent of the outstanding Piper
stock. Id. Before CCI finally withdrew from the control struggle, it acquired 29,200
additional shares. Id.
15. In addition to the damage claim, CCI originally moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent BPC from gaining control of Piper. The motion was denied
by the district court. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.. 303 F. Supp.
191, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
the motion. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 577 (2d
Cir. 1970) (en banc. However, the court of appeals also held that BPC and Piper
had not complied with two SEC regulations. See note 10 supra. Furthermore, the
court decided that BPC had violated rule lOb-6, but remanded for a determination of
whether the exemption of rule lOb-6(a) (3) (2) was applicable. 426 F.2d at 577.
At this point, CCI chose to forego equitable relief. 480 F.2d at 355.
16. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). The fact that Piper shareholders who declined to tender their shares to CCI
may have been the victims of the violations was not sufficient to establish standing
for CCI under rule 1Ob-5 or section 14(e). Id. at 1134, 1140.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1973). This rule, as interpreted by SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969), prohibits market purchases by the
offeror of shares subject to the pending offer. It should be noted that this interpretation was later codified in SEC rule lOb-13. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969).
18. 337 F. Supp. at 1142.
19. Piper violated section 14(e) by its misleading letter to the stockholders and
its failure to reveal the "put arrangement." See notes 84-85 infra. Both BPC, the
opposing tender-offeror, and First Boston, the underwriter of the Piper-BPC transaction, were liable under section 14(e) for their failure to disclose the impending sale
of the Bangor and Aroostook Railroad in the preliminary prospectus contained in
the registration statement, the final prospectus, and First Boston's opinion letter.
480 F.2d at 364-73. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
20. The defendants' actions had the effect of unlawfully influencing the Piper
shareholders to tender their shares to BPC, thereby giving BPC a majority of the
shares, and, accordingly, reducing the value of CCI's holdings since CCI had not
become the majority shareholder of Piper. 480 F.2d at 379.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss4/7
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dustries, Inc. v. PiperAircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973).
During the 1960's the tender offer became an increasingly popular
2
method of corporate acquisition, ' possessing distinct advantages over other
22
Prior
forms of takeover such as proxy contests and purchases of assets.
to 1968, one of the primary attractions of the tender offer was the relative
lack of applicable securities regulations. 23 Only section 10b of the Exchange
Act 24 and rule lOb-5 2 5 might have provided a private right for damages
26
However, in
for fraudulent practices arising in a tender offer situation.
27
"in conlOb-5,
rule
of
the
language
Corp.
Steel
Birnbaum v. Newport
to limit
construed
was
security,"
of
any
sale
nection with the purchase or
neither
Consequently,
the class of plaintiffs to actual purchasers or sellers.
a tender offeror who was unsuccessful in an attempt at corporate acquisition,
nor a shareholder of a target corporation who declined to tender his shares,
had standing under that rule to sue either the target corporation or others
for deceptive practices which might have been the cause of the target
corporation shareholders' rejection of the tender offer. A tender offeror
was not considered a protected purchaser under rule lOb-5 because its
purchases could not be deemed to have been influenced by the unlawful
actions. Where the illegal activities influenced the shareholders of the
target corporation to refuse to tender, the tender offeror had no standing to
sue because it had not made a purchase. The non-tendering shareholder
21. For example, eight tender offers were reported on the NYSE and the
American Stock Exchange in 1960. Forty-four were listed in 1964 and 32 in the
first six months of 1966. Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 3, at 317. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 3, at 1253 nn.15 & 16.
22. See, e.g., VI L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS (Supp. to 2d ed.) 3655-57
(1969); Young, Judicial Enforcement of the Williams Amendments: The Need to
Separate the Questions of Violation and Relief, 27 Bus. LAW. 391, 392 (1972) ; Note,
Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1969).
23. This was especially true of cash tender offers which had no disclosure
requirements. Disclosure in relation to exchange offers was mandated by 1933 Act
§§ 5-8, 10; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77h, 77j (1970).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
25. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interestate (sic) commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

26. Neither section 10b nor rule 10b-5 expressly grant a private right to
recover damages for violations. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946), established the principle of private standing to sue under section 10b.
Since a tender offer essentially involves the purchase of securities by the tender offeror
and the sale of securities when the shareholder of the target corporation sells his
stock to the tender offeror (see note 3 supra), section 10b is applicable to the tender
offer, subject to the purchaser-seller requirement. See generally Note, supra note 22,
at 380. Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), however, provided such a
right of action in the case of exchange offers.
(1952).
343 of
U.S.
denied,
(2d Cir.),
cert.
F.2d 461
27. by
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of the target corporation was not categorized as a purchaser or seller since
he had not sold or purchased any securities, although his decision not to
tender may have been influenced by misrepresentations on the part of the
target corporation or others. 28 This position was reaffirmed recently in
Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Cdrp.29
Two general exceptions developed to the Birnbaum doctrine. First,
the purchaser-seller limitation was not considered applicable when injunctive relief was being sought under rule lOb-5.30 Second, a plaintiff not
ordinarily having standing could bring suit for violations of rule lOb-5 if
the circumstances made him a "forced seller." 3'
28. See, e.g., Lockwood, CorporateAcquisitions and Actions Under Sections lOb
and 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 Bus. LAw. 365, 375 (1968).

29. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). The
Birnbaum rule restricting the application of rule 10b-5 to actual purchasers or

sellers has been generally accepted. See, e.g., L. Loss, supra note 22, at 3614-25;
Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under
Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 BUFF. L. REv. 93 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of
the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268, 269 (1968).
However, the Birnbaum rule has also been highly criticized as demonstrated
by the following statement:
[Tihe Birnbaum doctrine seems incompatible with the broad spectrum of private
rights which have mushroomed under the federal securities laws in the last
twenty years. The infinite variety of problems which the courts are called upon
to consider, the many varieties and complexities of fraud which are possible in
contemporary securities markets, the ingenuity of potential wrongdoers - all argue
strongly against having any rigid, inflexible judicial requirement other than the
presence of the fraud itself as a sine qua non of the right to sue.
Id. at 275-76. But see L. Loss, supra note 22, at 3617; Kellogg, supra, at 114-15.
The SEC has argued that the Birnbaum rule be relaxed. Brief for SEC as
Amicus Curiae at p. 8, Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). The Seventh Circuit recently
abandoned the Birnbaum rule. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654.
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,

.....
U.S-

-----94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974).

The Supreme Court in Superintendent of Life Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971), noted in The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 50, 260
(1972), while not discussing the Birnbaum rule, granted standing under rule 10b-5
by broadly interpreting the phrase "in connection with." The plaintiff corporation's
entire stock was purchased by the defendant, who, actually without funds with which
to make the purchase, was able to make it appear that he was adequately financed.
The defendant obtained control of the corporation, and transferred corporate funds to
cover his original purchase. The defendant now owned all of the plaintiff's stock,
having used the plaintiff's assets to purchase it. The Court held that the defendant's
scheme constituted fraud "in connection with" the plaintiff's sale of his entire stock
to the defendant. Id. One court has regarded the Supreme Court's decision as an
affirmation of the Birnbaum rule. Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339
(9th Cir. 1972). But see Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., supra.
30. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1970) (standing under rule 10b-5 to the non-tendering shareholder). Accord, Mutual
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Greater Iowa
Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Jachimiec v. Schenley Indus., Inc.,
No. 51024 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 841 (1965).
31. This exception was formulated in the Second Circuit. When a defendant's
violation of rule 10b-5 contributes to his acquisition of sufficient holdings to force a
merger with the target corporation, a non-tendering shareholder of the target corporation has standing to sue for damages because he has been "forced to sell" his
shares to the defendant or collect their cash value when the target corporation was
absorbed by the merger. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
An unsuccessful contestant for corporate control, defeated by large cash purchases of the target corporation shares by the defendant, which artificially drove up
the price of the remaining shares and decreased the attractiveness of his tender offer,
had standing to sue for this violation of rule 10b-5. The plaintiff was "forced to
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss4/7
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Partly in response to the paucity of fraud provisions covering all tender
offers and the absence of disclosure requirements regarding cash tender
offers, Congress passed the Williams Bill 32 which amended the Exchange
Act to include section 14(e),33 a provision similar in language to rule
10b-5, except that it was expressly applicable to tender offers. In the first
case to apply section 14(e), standing was granted to the target corporation
and non-tendering shareholders to sue for a preliminary injunction against
deceptive practices by the tender offeror. 4 Standing under section 14(e)
was then extended to shareholders of the tender offeror,3 5 and in H. K.
Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co.,36 recently to the tender offeror himself.
Although Porter involved the issue of the standing of a tender offeror
to sue the target corporation for damages, no court, until the instant case,
had directly discussed the constitutionality of granting standing to a tender
offeror under section 14(e). More significantly, no court had attempted
to apply the substantive aspects of scienter and causation to violations of
section 14(e), especially where a plaintiff had not relied on the deceptive
acts, but had suffered damage through fraud affecting third parties, i.e.,
the shareholders tendering securities to an adverse tender offeror.3 7
sell" his minority holdings in the target corporation under threat of anti-trust action
when the defendant, his chief business competitor, merged with the target corporation. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
See Lowenfels, supra note 29, at 275-77, wherein the author argues that as

the result of these exceptions, the Birnbaum rule has met its demise. However, the

article was written prior to the Iroquois decision. See note 29 supra. The 3irnbaum
rule has since been rejected in the Seventh Circuit. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, __ U.S ___ 94 S. Ct.
1979 (1974).
32. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), amending, Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 §§ 13-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)
to (e), n(d) to (f) (Supp. V, 1965-69)), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) to (e),
78n(a) to (f) (1970).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such

offer, request, or invitation.

Id.

34. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969). See Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970) (target corporation
granted an injunction to discontinue an exchange offer until misrepresentations in the
annual report were corrected).
In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970), although it concerned a rule lOb-5 violation, the
court suggested that section 14(e) should resolve any doubts about standing in tender
offer cases. 419 F.2d at 798-99.
35. Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 914 (D. Me. 1971)
(claim dismissed on other grounds).
36. 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972), af'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973) (suit
against the target corporation).
37. In Porter, the court was concerned only with the defendant target corporation's motion for dismissal. 353 F. Supp. at 165. The instant case is singularly
importantbybecause
the status
of BPC.
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stated: 1974
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Because of a lack of direct causal connection between the alleged violations of section 14(e) and the injury to CCI, the district court, in the
88
instant case, found it unnecessary to discuss the concept of standing.
However, the court of appeals considered CCI's standing to sue to be the
9
threshold issue. Citing two United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the "cases and controversies" clause of the Constitution, 40 the
court held that CCI had the requisite interest in the resolution of the
controversy, in the constitutional sense, to be granted standing to seek
41
relief against all three defendants for the acts prohibited by section 14(e).
The Chris-Craftcourt then focused upon the critical issue of the case
whether section 14(e) contained language limiting the class of plaintiffs
to exclude tender offerors. The facial silence of the section with respect
to the appropriate parties to a suit for violation of its provisions, demanded
interpretation. 42 Stating that "[t] he general objective surely is to encourage
extensive and accurate disclosure of information relevant to a tender
offer,' 43 the court found that the most desirable means of furthering this
44
objective was to permit all the victims of violations to sue for damages.
Under the principles of tort law, CCI appeared to be such a victim because
it had a reasonable opportunity to gain control of Piper, but lost its chance
through the illegal conduct of the defendants. 45 The court determined,
therefore, that a tender offeror had standing to sue under section 14(e),
40
yet it declined to rule on CCI's standing under rule 10b-5.
The Chris-Craftcourt's holding with respect to section 14(e) extended
the protection of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities regulations to
case of first impression with respect to the right of a tender offeror to claim damages
for statutory violations by his adversary." 480 F.2d at 362 (emphasis added).
38. 337 F. Supp. at 1134.
39. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
40. U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 2.

41. 480 F.2d at 359-60. Prior cases apparently assumed there was standing in
the constitutional sense. For example, Judge Pettine, in a supplemental opinion to
Porter, stated: "The Court has no doubt that plaintiff has standing in the constitutional sense." 353 F. Supp. at 166.
Both concurring judges in Chris-Craft believed that the constitutionality of
standing was irrelevant with respect to the second issue of standing - whether the
language of section 14(e) limited the class of persons entitled to bring suit. 480 F.2d
at 396 (Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting) ; id. at 393 (Gurfein, J., concurring).
42. Section 14(e) states only that the named acts will be unlawful if committed
in connection with any tender offer, and does not contain the "purchase or sale"
language of rule lob-5.
43. 480 F.2d at 361.
44. Id., citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964) (shareholders
deceived by misleading proxy solicitations in violation of section 14(a) have standing).
45. Under common law principles, a party has a cause of action against another
who interferes, through unlawful means, with his "prospective advantage" in a transaction such as the purchase of property. W. PRoSsER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 130 (4th ed. 1971). See 480 F.2d at 361-62.
46. The court stated:
Although the fraudulent acts involved in the instant case literally are proscribed by Rule lOb-5, we conclude that § 14(e) is the antifraud provision which
more appropriately provides the basis for CCI's standing to sue here. It therefore
is unnecessary for us to decide whether CCI has standing to sue under § 10b
and Rule 10b-5.
Id. at 359.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss4/7
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all parties involved in a tender offer. However, the court did not completely seal the gap originally created by the purchaser-seller requirement,
because it chose not to resolve the question of standing under rule lOb-5.
The implication is that the Birnbaum doctrine retains vitality in the Second
Circuit. 47 The court's justification for its action - that the enactment of
section 14(e) evidenced congressional intent that section 10b should not
apply to the tender offeror or the target corporation 48 - is not convincing
since one reason for the addition of section 14(e) to the Exchange Act
was to resolve the difficulties created by the courts' rather narrow reading
49
of section l0b and rule lOb-5.
The Chris-Craft decision does, however, narrow the gap in the
coverage of the securities regulations, even if it does not seal it. Cases involving the ordinary exchange of securities remain subject to the purchaserseller requirement under rule lOb-5, but cases involving tender offers are
not so restricted under section 14(e). Conceivably, hybrid transactions
may arise which do not fall within the conventional concept of a tender
offer. 50 Section 14(e) does not clarify the issue because it does not provide
a definition of a tender offer. 51 Thus, one of two things must occur if the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws are to be comprehensive. Either
the purchaser-seller requirement of rule lOb-5 must be abrogated or the
conventional meaning of tender offer must be expanded to provide standing
under section 14(e) to victims of fraudulent practices who are not purchasers or sellers.
The elimination of the Birnbaum doctrine in the Second Circuit, at
least, seems doubtful in view of the recent decisions that have re-affirmed
the rule. 52 However, it may be argued that, as a result of the conclusions
reached in Chris-Craft, the contentions usually made in support of the
47. Note, however, that the Birnbaum rule is no longer valid in the Seventh
Circuit. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied -.....
U.S .....
94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974). Plaintiff shareholders obtained
rescission of an issue of shares to the defendants, made in consideration of the transfer
of defendants' car leasing business to their corporation, because of the defendants'
material misstatements and omissions in violation of rule lOb-5. Id.
48. 480 F.2d at 360. The Chris-Craft court concluded: "[T]he 1968 amendment
is an indication that 'there was no standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 by either the
tender offeror or by the target corporation.' " Id., quoting Iroquois Indus., Inc. v.
Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
909 (1970).
49. The House Report stated: "In this area of investor protection, the United
States, which is otherwise in the forefront, has lagged behind other countries ... "
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
50. See, e.g., Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973) (open market
purchases for the purpose of acquiring control do not alone constitute a tender
offer); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla.), vacated per
stipulation, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. 1972), noted in 1972 DUKE L.J. 1051 (a
coordinated series of negotiated purchases from a large number of shareholders in a
short time held to be a tender offer).
51. See Note, supra note 22, at 388-89.
52. After the Iroquois decision, the Second Circuit again reaffirmed the Birnbaum
rule in Superintendent of Life Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 335, 360-61
(2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The vitality of the
Birnbaum rule after the Supreme Court's decision has been disputed. See notes
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Birnbaum rule are less persuasive - the danger of unlimited liability of
defendants in absence of the rule, and the problems of proof of causation
and damages. 53 The Chris-Craft court, noting that private damage actions
are significant in enforcing the securities regulations, 5 4 permitted CCI to
collect damages although it had not been deceived by the activities of the
defendants.5 5 Since CCI was granted standing to sue under section 14(e),
it is logical to assume that shareholders who failed to tender their shares
to CCI also have a right of action for damages against the defendants
"
Consequently, the contentions favoring the Birnunder section 14(e). O
baum rule in rule lOb-5 cases were outweighed by policy considerations
7
when applied to section 14(e) by the Chris-Craft court.
There is however, an obvious distinction between an ordinary purchase
or sale of securities to which rule lOb-5 is applicable and a tender offer to
which section 14(e) applies. The tender offeror seeks corporate takeover
at a tremendous cost,58 and the necessity for vigorous enforcement of the
securities laws is greater than with an ordinary purchase or sale of
securities. 59 Second, the limiting language of rule lOb-5 that gave rise to
the Birnbaum doctrine is not present in section 14(e). The courts have
primarily justified the Birnbaum doctrine on the basis that it represents
congressional policy, and that Congress should decide whether to eliminate
the purchaser-seller requirement by amending section 10b. 60 It is, therefore,
53. See, e.g., Kellogg, supra note 32, at 113-15.

54. 480 F.2d at 356-57. The court stated:
But the Supreme Court, as well as other federal courts including our own, have
recognized that vigorous enforcement of the federal securities laws, particularly
the antifraud provisions, can be accomplished effectively only when implemented
by private damage actions.

Id. at 356.
55. The measure of the damages for which BPC, Piper, and First Boston were
jointly and severally liable was the decrease in the appraisal value of the Piper shares
held by CCI due to BPC's acquisition of majority control which made CCI a minority
shareholder. Id. at 380.
56. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969), gave shareholders of the target corporation standing under section 14(e)
to sue for an injunction. Since the tender offeror has standing under section 14(e)
to sue for damages when the shareholders were influenced into rejecting its tender
offer, the non-tendering shareholders should be able to sue under section 14(e) for
damages resulting from the same violations.
57. If the non-tendering shareholders as well as the tender offeror have standing
under section 14(e), defendants in a section 14(e) case face liability to an extensive
class of plaintiffs. Apparently, the Chris-Craft court considered that the encouragement of private lawsuits as a means to enforce the securities regulations was the overriding consideration. Cf. note 54 supra.
58. For example, the facts of the instant case indicate that CCI invested over
$44 million in its attempt to obtain control of Piper. 480 F.2d at 354-55.
59. A tender offer is generally used as a means of corporate takeover while an
ordinary purchase or sale of securities is less likely to be made with this intention.
Hence, it is arguable that the target corporation, which faces the danger of takeover,
would be more likely to, either willingly or negligently, overstep the bounds of the
fraud provisions in encouraging rejection of the tender offer. See Schmults & Kelly,
Cash Takeover Bids - Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115, 134 (1967).
60. See, e.g., Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d at 969. The
Iroquois court stated:
The Birnbaum rule recognizes the policy of Congress in enacting Section 10(b)
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss4/7
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unlikely that the Birnbaum rule will be abolished, 61 and the future may
witness an effort to seal the apparent gap in the coverage of the antifraud provisions through the formulation of a broad interpretation of
tender offer.6 2
Once the issue of standing was resolved affirmatively, the Chris-Craft
court was required to determine whether section 14(e) had been violated,
and, if so, whether the defendants were responsible. It is not surprising
that the court examined and applied those rules and precedents developed
under rule lOb-5, since both are similar in language. 63 As the court in
Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co. 64 stated:

When Congress passed 14(e), lOb-5 had already been interpreted
by the federal courts to apply to tender offers; and it is clear from the
legislative history that 14(e) was not adopted as wholly separate and
distinct from 10b-5, but rather, was intended by Congress to "affirm"
the applicability to tender offers of the standards of disclosure in
rule lOb-5.65
By analogy to rule lOb-5, there is a violation of section 14(e) when
the fact misrepresented or omitted is material in the sense that a reasonable investor would weigh it in his decision whether or not to invest. 68
The defendant is culpable under section 14(e) if he knew the facts were
67
misstated or omitted, or should have known with reasonable diligence.

Id.

frauded purchasers and sellers. It is not the province of the courts to extend
Section 10(b) to apply to transactions not intended to be covered by Congress.

61. But see note 47 supra.
62. For an excellent review of cases defining tender offers and a suggested definition that expands the conventional meaning of tender offer, see Note, supra note 3.
A probable collateral effect of the liberalization of standing under section
14(e) is the creation of a new defensive tool for those opposing a tender offer. As
Judge Friendly noted in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), there is a distinct danger that trivial suits will arise solely
designed to defeat or delay legitimate tender offers. Id. at 947. For a possible remedy,
see Comment, Tender Offers: The Liberalization of Standing Requirements Under
Section 14(e), 7 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REv. 561, 568 n.43 (1973).
63. The Chris-Craftcourt noted: "And yet the underlying proscription of § 14(e)
is virtually identical to that of Rule lob-5 ....
480 F.2d at 362.
64. [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
65. Id. at 98,705.
66. 480 F.2d at 363. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 912-14 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969) ; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) ; List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
67. 480 F.2d at 363. The Second Circuit previously indicated that mere negligence was not sufficient to permit recovery under section 10b. See, e.g., SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 n.15 (2d Cir. 1972). Knowledge
or reckless disregard for the truth is sufficient. 480 F.2d at 363. See, e.g., Shenitob
v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971). Consequently, by
analogy to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the test under section 14(e) seems to be a
knowing or reckless failure. The Chris-Craft court stated:
A failure to perform these duties with "due diligence" in issuing registration
materials provides a basis for suit under § 11 of the 1933 Act. A knowing or
reckless failure to discharge these obligations constitutes sufficiently culpable
conduct to justify a judgment under Rule lOb-5 or § 14(e) for damages . ...
480 F.2d at 363 (citation omitted).
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According to the court, the district court recognized these standards, but
erroneously applied them to the facts. 68 Consequently, the court held that
all three defendants were guilty of material violations of 14(e) .69
The fundamental point of disagreement with the district court was
on the issue of causation. 70 The court of appeals faced two serious difficulties in establishing the connection between the illegal acts of the defendants and the damages incurred by CCI. The first was whether CCI
could recover damages for events affecting it through third parties. The
second, provided that CCI could recover, was whether it could prove that
each shareholder who tendered to BPC relied on the omissions and misrepresentations of the defendants. The Second Circuit had already answered
the former question when it granted standing to CCI,71 and responded to
the latter by applying the principle of constructive reliance formed in Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,72 and recently extended to rule lOb-5 violations
in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.73 The essence of the principle
is that where the facts omitted are material to the reasonable investor's
decision to invest, it is logical to presume that there has been reliance on
the part of the investor. As a result, CCI need not prove that each and
every tendering shareholder relief on the omissions made by the defendants.
68. 480 F.2d at 364.
69. Piper knowingly violated section 14(e) by issuing the initial letter to the
shareholders (see note 84 infra) and recklessly disregarded its obligation to disclose
the "put arrangement" (see note 85 infra) and the compensatory plan (see note 8
supra) with BPC. 480 F.2d at 365-66. However, Piper was not liable to CCI for
the latter violation because it had no effect on the shareholders due to the fact that
CCI had notified Piper shareholders of the arrangement. Id. at 377.
BPC "showed reckless disregard" in failing to disclose its activities concerning the BAR. Id. at 369.
First Boston was culpable because it "possessed enough information reasonably to deduce that the BPC registration statement was materially inaccurate." Id.
at 373. Therefore, First Boston was liable as an aider and abettor of BPC since First
Boston was reckless in determining whether material falsity existed. Id. at 370. See
note 75 infra.
70. The lower court treated standing and causation as one issue. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
71. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
72. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Mills concerned a section 14(a) (proxy solicitation)
violation which resulted in a merger unfavorable to minority shareholders. The nontendering shareholders brought a class action on behalf of all shareholders in the
target corporation. The Court held that where the violation was essential to the
transaction (the merger), there is a presumption of reliance upon the violation by all
stockholders. Id. at 385. The district court in the instant case found Mills distinguishable because, in Mills, those directly affected by the violations were members of
the plaintiff class although the named parties had not relied on the deception. 337 F.
Supp. at 1139.
73. 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972), noted in The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86
HARy. L. REV. 50, 268 (1972). Affiliated Ute involved a continual non-disclosure by
defendants who were the intermediaries between the plaintiffs and the stock market.
The defendants never disclosed that they were selling the plaintiffs' shares on the
market at a higher price than that at which they bought the shares from the plaintiffs.
Id. at 152-53. It should be noted that the district court did not consider Affiliated Ute
because its opinion was written before Affiliated Ute was decided.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss4/7
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All that is required is a showing of materiality sufficient to raise the pre74
sumption of reliance.
The Chris-Craft court's use of the rationale of Affiliated Ute is extremely significant because it permits a plaintiff in the tender offer dispute
who has not relied on the alleged violations to circumvent the immense
obstacle of establishing reliance by every tendering shareholder by proving
only materiality. The court's extension of liability to First Boston, the
underwriter of the Piper-BPC transaction, 75 and its holding that BPC
violated rule lOb-6 76 are indications of the far reaching effect of its application of the Affiliated Ute decision.
In addition to the application of constructive reliance to provide the
causal connection between the violations of section 14(e) and CCI's injury,
the Chris-Craftcourt may have expanded the use of constructive reliance
as expressed in Affiliated Ute. The Affiliated Ute court recognized the
distinction between subsections (1) and (3) ,7 7 and subsection (2) of rule
lOb-5. 78 Subsection (2) is limited to half-truths and untrue statements
74. 480 F.2d at 375. But see id. at 399-400 (Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting) (reliance exists as a matter of law, not as a presumption).

In a more recent case, the Second Circuit has considered the principle of
"constructive reliance" under the label "causation in fact" See Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., - F.2d ---(2d Cir. 1974).
75. Under section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), a purchaser of
securities has a right to sue an underwriter for damages resulting from misleading
or false statements in the registration statement. The underwriter, under this section,
can escape liability by showing "due diligence" - a reasonable basis for believing,
after a reasonable investigation, that the statement was accurate. 480 F.2d at 370.
The Chris-Craftcourt held that CCI had standing to sue First Boston, the underwriter,
thereby effectively removing the purchaser requirement from section 11, as it had
from rule lOb-5 in the case of BPC and Piper, although CCI had not been directly
affected by the violation of section 14(e). The court described the standard of culpability for First Boston:
An underwriter is liable under § 14(e) as an aider and abettor of the issuer if he

was aware of a material falsity in the registration statement or was reckless in
determining whether material falsity existed.
Id. at 370. According to the court, the reason for the extension of liability is the rather
unique position that the underwriter occupies. Investors place great reliance on its
expertise in appraising the securities issue, its familiarity with the process of investigating the business conditions of a corporation, and its extensive resources for investigation. Id.
76. BPC had violated rule 10b-6 because it purchased Piper shares while awaiting SEC action on its exchange offer. See notes 13 & 17 supra. The court held that
the illegal purchases by BPC increased the value of Piper stock thereby raising the
presumption that the shareholders regarded the BPC offer as more attractive than
before because the increase could have been attributed to the soundness of BPC's
exchange offer. 480 F.2d at 378 & n.33.
77. Subsections (1) and (3) describe a device, scheme, artifice to defraud, or
any act, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit. See
note 25 supra.
78. Subsection (2) describes any statement that is untrue, or any statement that
is misleading due to the omission of a material fact necessary to make the statement
not misleading. See note 25 supra. In recognizing these distinctions in rule lOb-5, the
Supreme Court stated:
To be sure, the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the making of an untrue
statement of a material fact and the omission to state a material fact. The first
and third subparagraphs are not so restricted.
406 U.S. at 152-53. See also SEC v. Crofters, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 236, 255 (S.D.
Ohio 1972).
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as opposed to a complete failure to disclose3 9 The distinction between the
subsections is significant because damage suits under subsection (2)

may

require proof of actual reliance by the plaintiff claiming the violation of
rule lOb-5, while such proof is not essential under subsections (1) and
(3). 80 The violation of rule lOb-5 alleged in Affiliated Ute was designated
by the court as a failure to disclose, and therefore was a device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or course of business, within the meaning of subsections
(1) or (3). 81 Hence, the plaintiff only had to prove that the facts withheld
were material in order to raise the presumption of reliance. Under Affiliated
Ute, constructive reliance does not appear applicable to false statements
and half-truths proscribed by subsection (2).82 Since the language in
section 14(e) is similar to rule lOb-5, application of constructive reliance
might not be proper in situations involving false statements and halftruths under section 14(e). 8 3
Examination of the violations of section 14(e) by each of the three
defendants in the Chris-Craft case reveals that the instant court may have
gone beyond Affiliated Ute by applying constructive reliance to false statements and half-truths. Piper's illegal acts, the statement that CC's offer
was "inadequate," and the failure to mention the "put arrangement" in the
press release of the Grumman agreement, could be categorized as an untrue
statement of a material fact 4 and an omission of a material fact necessary
to make the statements made concerning the Grumman agreement not
79. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1439 (2d ed. 1962).
80. Id.
81. 406 U.S. at 153. The lower court in Affiliated Ute had held that the activity
came within the meaning of subsection (2) of rule lob-5 and required proof of actual
reliance. Id.
82. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 73, at 271. The necessity
of showing actual reliance in cases of affirmative misrepresentation has been criticized.
See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173-74 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Painter, Insider Information: Growing Pains for the Development of
Federal CorporationLaw Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1366-71 (1965).
But see List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 92,591, at 98,705 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
83. The language of rule lob-5(2) is reproduced in section 14(e). Those
activities described in rule 10b-5(1) and (3) are combined in section 14(e) as

"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices . . . ." See note 33 supra.
84. The court held that the inadequacy was a misrepresentation as to the desirability of the price of CCI's offer. Since Piper had later agreed to sell shares to
Grumman at the same price, the court also held that it was an intentional misrepresentation. 480 F.2d at 364--65. Piper argued that the inadequacy referred to factors
other than price, primarily the quality of CCI's management, a proposition with
which the district court agreed. Id. at 364. Apparently, Piper's preference for BPC
was based on its high regard for BPC's management. Id. at 354.
It is interesting to note that CCI acquired more shares through its initial
offer than it had originally intended to obtain. See notes 3 & 6 supra. Judge Mansfield,
in the dissenting portion of his opinion, interpreted this to mean that CCI suffered no
injury as the result of Piper's acts and therefore that Piper was not liable to CCI.
480 F.2d at 401 (Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority concluded
that Piper's actions prevented CCI from obtaining even more shares through the first
offer and had a continuing adverse effect on CCI's attempts to gather additional
shares. Id. at 377.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss4/7

14

Pettis: Securities Regulation - An Unsuccessful Tender Offeror Has Standi

MARCH

1974]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

misleading. s5 The failure of BPC and First Boston to mention the negotiations surrounding the BAR could constitute an omission of a material fact
necessary to make the statements concerning the valuation of BPC not
misleading. According to Affiliated Ute, constructive reliance should not
apply where, as in the situation of all three defendants, there has been
only an untrue statement or a statement that is misleading due to omission
of a material fact.
However, it is arguable that the Chris-Craft court did conform to the
Affiliated Ute decision. By regarding the acts of the defendants as a whole,
these violations of section 14(e) could have been construed by the court
as a scheme to defeat CCI's takeover bid, with Piper and BPC as participants and First Boston as an aider and abettor. When viewed in this
manner, the defendants' violations of section 14(e) are no longer considered
as isolated false and misleading statements, but rather as a fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative act or practice which does not require proof
of actual reliance. Hence, the Chris-Craft court's application of constructive reliance would be consistent with the prevailing authority.
The application of constructive reliance to section 14(e) and rule
lOb-6, and the extension of standing to CCI, a tender offeror, are the two
significant contributions of the Chris-Craft case. A liberal principle of
causation is now available to provide standing to sue for damages to plaintiffs who may not be directly affected by acts prohibited under section 14(e).
Once standing is granted, plaintiffs face a relatively light burden in proving
reliance by third parties because of the doctrine of constructive reliance.
Together, these two contributions will prove helpful in enforcing the antifraud provisions of the securities regulations in the tender offer situation.
However, gaps still remain due to the purchaser-seller requirement and
the lack of a statutory definition of tender offer.
Jeffrey L. Pettit

85. Although the court did not find fault with Piper's agreement with Grumman
as a means of defeating CCI, the court did hold that by recklessly failing to disclose

the "put arrangement," Piper had made it appear that a favorable deal had been
completed with Grumman which was likely to affect the attitude of Piper shareholders
to CCI's initial offer. However, unknown to the shareholders, Grumman could have
rescinded the transaction at any time by exercising its option. Id. at 365.
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